Bersin is executive chair at Altana Technology and Inaugural North America and fellow at the Wilson Center. He previously served as U.S. attorney for the Southern District of California and “border czar” for the U.S.-Mexico border during the Clinton istration and as commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection during the Obama istration. He lives in Washington, D.C. Marroquín Bitar is Inaugural North America Scholar at the Wilson Center and lives in Washington, D.C.
This Sunday, Mexicans will partake in the country’s most consequential election ever, measured both by the 100 million-plus citizens eligible to vote and the 20,708 leadership positions to be decided at the ballot box. These include all 628 seats in Congress, nine governorships, some 20,000 local roles, and the crown jewel of Mexico’s political system: la silla del águila (the eagle’s throne) or presidential seat.
With a significant lead in the polls, it is a foregone conclusion that Claudia Sheinbaum, a member of the ruling Morena party, will be the next president, becoming the first woman and scientist to hold the office. Her academic credentials and tenure as secretary of the environment (2000-2006) and mayor of Mexico City (2018-2023) are strong as are her ties with her mentor, Mexico’s current president, Andres Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO). Sheinbaum’s governing style will be different from the mercurial AMLO, and although ideologically further to the left, she likely will not depart far from her predecessor in key policy areas central to the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship such as trade, energy and the border.
What changes should we expect from the election on these crucial ties? First, as the U.S. pivots away from China and vice versa, Mexico emerged as the U.S.’ top trading partner, engaging in commercial exchanges nearly 50 percent larger than U.S.-China trade during the first quarter of 2024 alone. On this front, Sheinbaum has pledged to encourage firms to shift operations to Mexico and prioritize U.S.-Mexico ties to reduce their supply chain links with China, a strategy known as nearshoring.
On energy, Sheinbaum has proposed a $13.6 billion energy plan, which includes investment from the private sector and aims to increase generation from wind and solar. However, Sheinbaum has also promised to continue AMLO’s ultra-nationalist policy of energy sovereignty and unwavering for highly indebted and corrupt state firms like Pemex. It remains unclear how her expressed for the dismantling of the 2013 energy liberalizing reform can be reconciled with the desire to increase foreign and private participation in the energy sector and Mexico’s market access commitments under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (NAFTA’s successor). In other words, conflicting energy policies could jeopardize billions of dollars in bilateral trade and investment in the sector by triggering a dispute with the U.S.
With respect to border-related cooperation with the U.S., Sheinbaum will likely continue in lockstep along the path AMLO has followed with both the Trump and Biden istrations. In effect, the bargain struck has been that Mexico will accede to U.S. demands to conduct heightened enforcement activities against irregular migrants — so long as U.S. authorities do not otherwise interfere in Mexican affairs or bilateral trade. Mexico’s lack of capacity to detain migrants for very long or the resources to deport migrants to their countries of origin has resulted in “catch and release” on a grand scale and the regular resumption by migrants of their smuggler-assisted journeys north to the U.S. border.
As a result, the level of illegal migration currently taking place into and through Mexico to the United States has exceeded the previous record by at least a factor of two, and probably more. Last year’s entry of 3.2 million irregular migrants into the U.S. is historically unprecedented. These irregular flows are disruptive to both societies in ways that are politically unacceptable in the United States and increasingly so in Mexico.
In sum, it seems clear that a new partnership arrangement between Mexico and the U.S. to manage irregular migration is required, regardless of who is elected U.S. president in November. However, how the agreement functions and how it is reached will differ depending on whether Trump’s or Biden’s team is negotiating it. In either event, Sheinbaum, as Mexico’s likely new president, will not act differently from AMLO on migration at least until then. The question remains whether she will, as AMLO never did, grasp the longstanding need for closer cooperation with the U.S. on these and other critical security issues. Regrettably, Mexico seems more likely than not to continue in an entirely reactive mode as the U.S. Southwest border struggles in the absence of comprehensive immigration reform in this country.
